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Study of FPGA Implementation of Entropy Norm Computation for IP Data
Streams
Subramanya Nagalakshmi
ABSTRACT
Recent literature has reported the use of entropy measurements for anomaly detection
purposes in IP data streams. Space efficient randomized algorithms for estimating entropy
of data streams are available in the literature. However no hardware implementation of
these algorithms is available. The main challenge to software implementation for IP data
streams has been in storing large volumes of data, along with, the requirement of high speed
at which they have to be analyzed. In this thesis, a recent randomized algorithm available
in the literature is analyzed for hardware implementation. Software/hardware simulations
indicate it is possible to implement a large portion of the algorithm on a low cost Xilinx
Virtex-II Pro FPGA with trade-offs for real-time operation. The thesis reports on the
feasibility of this algorithm’s FPGA implementation and the corresponding trade-offs and
limitations.
vi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Internet has become the most popular means of communications in every aspect,
from simple information exchange to economic activity and transfer of personal and sensi-
tive data. It is economical, viable and the fastest medium for information exchange for a
number of everyday activities. But it has also become an easy target for fraud, theft and
other forms of attacks. With increased security risks, it has become crucial to monitor and
classify any anomalous IP traffic behavior. The consequences of attacks on the Internet can
have serious economical impact to the Internet service provider or the organization under
attack. The quicker we become aware of an attack, the faster we can respond to safeguard
stakeholder interests. One way to monitor the IP traffic involves processing and analyzing
these data streams. While software analyzers are popular among network administrators
they rely on capture of the IP data stream information in real-time and posteriori off-line
analysis of the captured data using various rules [1, 2]. For a 10 Gbit/sec router, with an
assumed average packet size of 300 bytes (backbone network [3]), a one minute capture of
packet headers at peak load can generate roughly 4.6 GB of data and the analysis thereof
can take considerable time. Even on a slower router of 1 Gbit/sec and average packet
size ranging from 50 bytes (Email type traffic) to 1500 bytes (Ethernet MTU– maximum
transfer unit), 2.8 GB to 95 MB respectively, of data needs to be captured in 1 minute and
analyzed. Thus valuable time that could be used to respond to an attack is often lost and
large storage requirements are an essential feature of such software analyzers. It has also
become important to design some means for summarizing network traffic information in
a succinct way, so that one may perform useful analysis (for example: detecting denial of
service attacks, detecting spam broadcast) of a network stream in real-time. Additionally,
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it makes sense to maintain summary of network traffic at dedicated points that may be
used at any time to analyze traffic flow across two or more points [4].
The measurement of anomalous behavior in Internet traffic using packet header features
such as addresses, port numbers through Shannon’s entropy has been a growing research
area in recent years. Entropy has been shown to be a sensitive measure for detecting anom-
alies [5]. It has also been shown to present lots of challenges [6]. Automating the process of
detecting anomalies is quite challenging because of the difficulty in dividing the traffic into
what is normal and what is anomalous behavior [5]. Variations in the traffic flow might
be small enough to be considered anomalous at a local level but at a macro level it can
be drowned as insignificant. By using entropy calculations on packet destination/source
addresses and destination/source port numbers as features in a higher level principal com-
ponent analysis algorithm, authors in [5] show success in sensitive classification between
normal and anomalous behavior. In [8], while the entropy based features are used, the
principal component analysis algorithm is shown to need considerable tuning to provide
good classification between normal and anomalous behavior. General consensus in the
research community seems to be that entropy of features of packet headers is a sensitive
measure for use in higher level algorithms to separate normal and anomalous traffic. In
Table 1.1, the entropy of features to be monitored for successful detection of various types
of attacks from [5] is reproduced.
For IP traffic data, the Shannon entropy of a packet feature which takes 1, . . . n different
values with corresponding discrete probabilities pi is given by
H = −
n∑
i=1
pi log2 (pi) ≤ log2(n) (1.1)
The inequality in (1.1) is exact when the feature is uniformly distributed. Computing
entropy requires the probabilities pi. A simple approach to estimating the probabilities
involves the computation of a histogram. For example, consider the IP port numbers
ranging from 0 to 65535 which are divided into 3 categories by [7] as Well Known Ports
(0 to 1023), Registered Ports (1024 to 49151), and Dynamic and/or Private Ports (49152
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Table 1.1. Anomalies and Packet Features to be Monitored [5]
Anomaly type Explanation Packet features to check
Alpha flows Usually large volume P2P Source & destination address.
DOS Denial of Service Attack Destination & source address.
(distributed or single-source)
Flash Crowd Unusual burst of traffic to Destination address & port.
to single destination,from a
typical distribution of sources
Port Scan Probes to many destination Destination address & port
ports on a small set of
destination addresses
Outage events Traffic shifts due to equipment Source & destination address
failures or maintenance
Point to Multipoint SPAM broadcast Source & destination address
Worms Malicious code broadcast Destination address & port
to 65535). In [9] packets with a destination port in the Well Known ports are divided into
bins of 10 port numbers each. Since packets with port number 80 comprise the majority
of the network traffic, they are separated in [9] into a single bin. This produces 104 packet
bins. Packets with destination port in the Registered Ports are divided into 482 additional
bins, with each bin covering 100 port numbers with the exception of the bin that covers
the last 28 port numbers from 49124 to 49151. Packets with Dynamic and/or Private Port
numbers are grouped into a single bin. The captured IP data can now be analyzed using
the 587 different bins and the frequencies of each bin divided by the total number of packets
analyzed is taken to represent the probabilities pi needed to compute the entropy in (1.1).
While entropy calculations are simple to conceptualize, the direct approach of histogram
computation and estimating probabilities from it suffers from the same drawback as capture
of data in current software packages viz. large memory requirements and slow analysis.
Using such entropy features in higher level algorithms, therefore, also suffers. It should
be noted that while port number range is known apriori, the range of packet addresses in
a stream of IP traffic cannot be known apriori and therefore dynamic bin allocation for
histogram computation on packet addresses may be needed, adding to the complexity of
such schemes.
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Recently, a randomized algorithm [13] that uses less memory in computing entropy
on data streams has been proposed. The data stream view of Internet traffic is aimed at
avoiding capture of the packet header data. Instead, as each packet header arrives decisions
are made immediately and processing of that packet is completed before the next packet
arrives. Thus all such algorithms are single pass in nature. The randomized algorithm
proposed for entropy calculations on data streams has been studied on data collected from
routers [14] and shown to be successful in computing the entropy of the selected feature in
an off-line software analysis. The algorithm uses a large number of independent identically
distributed random variables whose arithmetic averages in groups of s1 are computed first
and then the median over s2 of these groups of the arithmetic average is computed to
estimate a measure of the entropy. The variance of the final estimate is greatly reduced by
this two stage process.
1.1 Thesis Motivation
To provide a reasonable assessment of attacks requires monitoring of IP traffic for rea-
sonable time periods (epochs). Furthermore, if the intent is to use the detected anomalies
for real-time control of the traffic and stop an attack, then the analysis has to be rapid.
Currently, most studies in the research literature are posteriori analysis of anomalies on
data collected from routers and the run-time of the software is high, and the schemes are
not conducive for near real-time application. To be useful, such anomaly detection schemes
have to keep up to the high data rates with the analysis throughput comparable to epochs
of short duration so that response measures can be activated sensitively.
While entropy calculations are simple if the requisite probabilities are known, and it
has been shown to be sensitive to detect anomalies, the direct approach of histogram
computation and estimating probabilities suffers from the same drawback as capture of
data in current software packages viz. large memory requirements and slow analysis. The
randomized algorithm of [13] uses less memory in computing entropy. This algorithm has
been studied on data collected from routers [14] and shown to be successful in computing
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the entropy of the selected features in an off-line software analysis. No attempt has been
made to implement this algorithm in hardware in the literature. Dedicated hardware for
such applications should be several orders of magnitude faster and thus may be conducive
to the use of entropy for real-time analysis. This thesis is a feasibility study of implementing
some of the core parts of the randomized algorithm for entropy calculation in hardware,
using the Xilinx FPGA tools.
1.2 Thesis Organization
In Chapter 2, the randomized algorithm of [13] that is studied in this thesis will be
discussed and simulation results of the algorithm in Matlab will be presented. The limita-
tions of the algorithm for hardware implementation will be pointed out. In Chapter 3, a
new derivation for the number of counters needed for the algorithm of [13] is carried out
to reduce the overall number of counters. An attempt at tightening the variance bounds
derived in the literature for the algorithm is also discussed. In Chapter 4, the hardware
design of the counter modules is considered and design trade offs are explored and sim-
ulated, and the results presented. A logarithm computation circuit along with averaging
and median calculating circuitry needed for post-epoch processing in the algorithm are also
designed and studied. The designs are integrated into a module. Chapter 5 concludes the
thesis with some possible alternative design strategies and suggestions for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
RANDOMIZED ALGORITHM FOR ESTIMATING ENTROPY OF DATA
STREAMS
A number of results using entropy as a measurement for anomaly detection purposes
are available in literature [5, 9, 10, 11]. This thesis focuses on the randomized algorithm
for entropy and entropy norm estimation based on the work available in [13] which has
been further studied by [14]. In [13] the metric called entropy norm FH as defined in (2.1)
is estimated.
FH =
n∑
i=1
mi log2(mi) (2.1)
In (2.1) it is assumed that there are n distinct packet headers (packet feature) 1, . . . , i, . . . n,
and for each i, the packet header repeats mi times in the stream. The total number of
packets in the stream is
∑
mi = m. If the probability of item i is taken as mim , the entropy
norm defined in (2.1) can be related to the entropy of the data stream of m as follows:
H =
n∑
i=1
mi
m
log2
(
m
mi
)
= log2(m)−
FH
m
(2.2)
The key contribution of [13] is that the algorithm for estimating FH has sub-linear space
requirements from which the entropy H can be reasonably estimated to within a (1 + ε)
factor.
2.1 Estimating the Entropy Norm
In [13], the authors introduce an estimator Y defined in (2.3), a random variable, which
gives the estimate for FH . The algorithm uses s1, s2 independent basic estimators
{Xij : 1 ≤ i ≤ s1, 1 ≤ j ≤ s2}, where each Xij is an independently, identically distributed
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random variable, as the random variable X defined below in Code 2.1 The proof that
the random variable Y estimates FH to within a (1 ± ε) factor with a (confidence limit)
probability greater than (1 − δ) is shown in [13]. The choice of values for the variables
s1, s2 which represent the number of counters needed to compute Y is based on ε, δ as
discussed below. It is also shown in [13] that individual random variable X is such that
E(X) = FH . Thus the repeated averaging of the random variables Xij over s1 counters
reduces the variance of the estimated FH while the median computation over the subsequent
s2 averages reduces the variance further and ensures the confidence limit.
Y = median
1 ≤ j ≤ s2
{
1
s1
s1∑
i=1
Xij
}
(2.3)
Input Stream: A = 〈a1, a2....am〉, where each ai  {1, 2, ...., n}.
1. Choose p uniformly at random from {1, ....m}.
2. Let r = | {q : aq = ap and p ≤ q ≤ m} |. Here r ≥ 1.
3. Let X = m (r log2(r)− (r − 1) log2(r − 1)) with a convention that 0 log2(0) = 0.
Code 2.1. Pseudocode for Computing the Random Variable X [13]
2.1.1 Estimating the Number of Counters s1 and s2
For any ε, δ  (0, 1], in [13] it is shown that if s1 ≥ 8 V ar[X](ε2E(X)2) and s2 is chosen as
integer ≥ 4 log2(1/δ) then the final estimator Y in (2.3) deviates from E(X) by no more
than εE(X) with probability at least 1−δ. Assuming that FH > m∆ , in [13], it is shown that
the V ar[X]E(X)2 < [log2(e) + log2(m)− 1]∆ = O(∆ log2(m)). ∆ > 0 is assumed in [13] while ∆
is assumed to be 1 or lower in [14]. The condition ∆ = 1 implies m > 2n [14]. Using the
bound and ∆ = 1 the minimum number of counters s1 ≥ 8 [log2(e)− 1 + log2(m)] /ε2. For
∆ = 1, δ = 0.2 and ε = 0.2 with m = 106, the corresponding values of s1, s2 are thus 4075
and 10 respectively. With m = 105, the corresponding values of s1, s2 are thus 3411 and
10 respectively.
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2.1.2 Simulation Results for Entropy Norm Computation
Since the number of counters needed for the algorithm is dependent on the quantity m,
consideration was given to how many of these could fit on a FPGA and at the same time,
not under utilize it. Based on an initial trial and error process, an epoch size (m) of a
million packets was fixed. The algorithm was coded in Matlab to examine its performance.
A stream of size m = 106 with n different integers is generated using Matlab random
function to simulate the packets. The number of counters s1, s2 are computed as per the
above subsection. Although not possible in practice because the number of distinct packet
headers (n) is not known apriori for a given epoch size (m), in simulations we have the
luxury of computing the histogram of the packets in our epoch. Using this histogram, the
true entropy norm can be easily computed in the simulations. In each case, in Table 2.1, the
number of counters used is s1 = 4075, s2 = 10, respectively i.e., a total of 40750 counters
with ε = 0.2, δ = 0.2 and ∆ = 1. To study the variability of the algorithm of [13], the same
stream is analyzed ten times (with the 40750 counters being selected at random locations
in the stream each time). Each run of the algorithm in the Matlab code takes about 14
minutes for the analysis of a million packet stream on a Windows dual core Pentium PC
with a clock of 1.54 GHz. The nomenclature used in Table 2.1 where the results of these
simulations are reported is as follows:
1. n = number of distinct packets in the stream. The requirement that m > 2n is
maintained in these simulations.
2. Fhm = Entropy norm of [13] (first run value out of the ten is given)
3. Ft = Entropy norm computed from the histogram of stream. Note that this compu-
tation is possible only in simulations.
4. Percentage error in entropy norm = 100|Fhm−Ft|Ft . This is computed for each run and
the maximum value over all 10 runs is reported.
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5. The ratio Fhm/Ft should lie within 0.8 to 1.20 (in at least 80% of the simulation
runs). This is reported as the minimum, average, and maximum over all 10 runs.
Table 2.1. FH Computation Simulations - Random Traffic
n Fhm Ft % error in norm ratio FhmFt
1500 9.3763 × 106 9.3820 × 106 0.1666 0.9983, 0.9998, 1.0009
10000 6.6476 × 106 6.6512 × 106 0.1895 0.9984, 0.9996, 1.0019
50000 4.3501 × 106 4.3586 × 106 0.3529 0.9965, 1.0002, 1.0032
500000 1.4110 × 106 1.4111 × 106 1.2181 0.9878, 1.0005, 1.0068
The above simulations were carried out at a higher value of ε = 0.2 because, the number
of counters s1, depends on this value. A smaller value of ε = 0.1 increases the counters
by a factor of 4 times. In spite of the ε = 0.2 and δ = 0.2, since the errors in computing
the entropy norm is very small, it is quite clear that the bounds given in [13] are quite
loose if the traffic is considered random. Random traffic pattern implies every packet
header up to the number being considered (n) is equally likely to occur in the stream.
Roughly, each packet header then repeats m/n times in the stream. To study the situation
of traffic which is somewhat more skewed as is likely in an attack type situation, another
set of simulations has been considered. In these simulations the stream is generated from
two vectors q, f where each element of q is the number of individually distinct packet
headers and the corresponding element of f is their frequency of repetition. Thus q =
[1, 40700, 9299], f = [9301, 2, 1] implies that the first packet header is repeated 9301 times,
40700 distinct successive packet headers are each repeated 2 times and the last 9299 distinct
packet headers are repeated just once. The total number of distinct packet headers is n =∑3
i=1 qi = 5×104, while the total number of elements in the stream ism =
∑3
i=1 qifi = 10
5.
The randomness in the stream is now in the location of the particular packet header whose
repetitions are specified in q, f in the overall stream of length m. Two cases are considered
in Table 2.2 with the corresponding q, f as given below: Case 1: q1 = [1, 40700, 9299], f1 =
[9301, 2, 1], Case 2: q2 = [5, 10, 100, 2000, 47885], f2 = [4823, 1000, 100, 4, 1]. A stream
described by vectors q, f is generated in Matlab and the generated stream analyzed by
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the algorithm. Each of the two cases has m = 105, n = 5 × 104 and the other algorithm
parameters are ε = 0.2, δ = 0.2 and ∆ = 1. On each stream (Case), the algorithm is run ten
times. The corresponding s1, s2 used for each run are 3411, 10 respectively and the total
number of counters for these cases is s1 × s2 = 34110. The results of these simulations are
presented in Table 2.2 with similar nomenclature. It is seen from Tables 2.1, 2.2 that in all
Table 2.2. FH Computation Simulations - Skewed Traffic
q, f Fhm Ft % error in norm ratio FhmFt
Case 1 2.0108 × 105 2.0402 × 105 2.3975 0.9760, 0.9966, 1.0154
Case 2 4.8363 × 105 4.7716 × 105 1.4486 0.9991, 1.0053, 1.0145
cases, the algorithm seems to provide a better estimate than prescribed by ε, δ choice. This
is largely the result of overestimation of the variance bound and therefore subsequently the
number of counters needed by the algorithm. For an epoch of a million packets, as will
be seen later, the overall count of 40750 counters is quite above the number of counters
implementable in the available FPGA. While ε, δ can be tightened, the drawback is that
this would increase the number of counters further. This is the limitation of the algorithm
given in [13]. There have been no further improvements to these bounds in the literature.
Some attempts to reduce the number of counters in this thesis is documented in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
REDUCING COUNTERS IN ENTROPY CALCULATION ALGORITHM
In this chapter, the counters needed for the algorithm in [13] are reduced by first using
a stronger bound on median computation from [12] and then an attempt at tightening the
bound on V ar(X) is shown. While many of the techniques used in the derivations carried
out in this chapter are available in the literature, their particularization to the problem at
hand, is new, in this thesis. The basic probabilistic analysis tools on which the algorithm
of [13] rests are Chebyshev’s inequality and Chernoff bound for medians [12] and these are
discussed next. The goal is to use a stronger result on the Chernoff bound for medians
from [12] to obtain a reduction in overall counters.
3.1 Probabilistic Analysis Tools
In this section Chebyshev’s inequality which describes the distribution of a random
variable around its expectation is stated. This inequality is useful as it holds independent
of the underlying probability distribution function of the random variable. Thereafter, the
application of Chernoff bound to median computation based on a theorem in [12] is also
provided. These two results and the definition of a basic random variable X are the basis
of the randomized algorithm of [13].
3.1.1 Chebyshev’s Inequality
The inequality states for a random variable X with expectation E(X) and variance
V ar(X), for any a > 0
Pr (|X −E(X)| ≥ a) ≤ V ar(X)
a2
(3.1)
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Specifically with a = εE(X), Chebyshev’s inequality states
Pr (|X −E(X)| ≥ εE(X)) ≤ V ar(X)
ε2E(X)2
(3.2)
If s1 independent, identically, distributed random variables with the same distribution as
X are arithmetically averaged then the random variable Y has the properties
Y =
∑s1
i=1Xi
s1
, E(Y ) = E(X), V ar(Y ) =
V ar(X)
s1
(3.3)
Thus by Chebyshev’s inequality (3.2), the distribution of Y satisfies
Pr (|Y −E(X)| ≥ εE(X)) ≤ V ar(X)
s1ε2E(X)2
=
1
K
(3.4)
Thus arithmetical averaging of the random variables ensures that the new estimator Y
has a reduced probability on the spread of its expectation. K in (3.4) is usually chosen a
positive integer (> 2 (from next subsection)). For a given choice of K, s1 can be obtained
as
s1 =
KV ar(X)
ε2E(X)2
(3.5)
3.1.2 Chernoff Bound on Median Estimator
Consider independent identically distributed random variables Yi, i = 1, . . . , s2 each of
which is as described in (3.3). Consider the median of these s2 random variables. Let this
be denoted Z. E(Z) = E(X). In this subsection the relationship of s2 to δ is determined
such that
Pr (|Z −E(X)| ≥ εE(X)) ≤ δ (3.6)
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Let random variables Q and R denote the number of Yi such that Yi < (1 − ε)E(X) and
Yi > (1 + ε)E(X) respectively, then
Pr (|Z −E(X)| ≥ εE(X)) = Pr
(
Q ≥ s2
2
or R ≥ s2
2
)
≤ Pr
(
Q ≥ s2
2
)
+ Pr
(
R ≥ s2
2
)
(3.7)
E(Q), E(R) are both ≤ s2K . The Chernoff Bound Theorem 4.4(a) of [12] states that for
random variables of type Q, R the inequalities on probabilities on the right hand side of
(3.7) can be written for α > 0 (this implies K > 2 in (3.8)) as:
Pr
(
Q ≥ K
2
s2
K
)
= Pr (Q ≥ (1 + α)E(Q)) =
(
eα
(1 + α)1+α
)E(Q)
=
 e(K2 −1)
(0.5K)0.5K

s2
K
(3.8)
Hence (3.7) can be simplified to
Pr (|Z −E(X)| ≥ εE(X)) ≤ 2
 e(K2 −1)
(0.5K)0.5K

s2
K
≤ δ (3.9)
For a given δ and K, an odd integer s2 can be solved for by using (3.9). For example with
δ = 0.2, and for K = 5,6,7,8 the corresponding values for s2 are 15,11,9,7 respectively.
3.1.3 New Reduced Estimates for Counter s2
For any ε, δ (0, 1] and integer K > 2 specified by the user, if s1 ≥ K V ar[X](ε2E(X)2) and s2
is determined as above for the choice of K, then the final estimator Y in (2.3) deviates
from E(X) by no more than εE(X) with probability at least 1− δ. The tighter bound in
the above subsection gives the value of s2 as 7 for K = 8 with ε = 0.2 and δ = 0.2. While
for [13] the corresponding value of s2 is 10. Since each of the s2 estimates are obtained
using s1 independent random variables X, using a smaller value leads to lesser overall
count. For the numerical values illustrated there is a 30% reduction in overall counters
(s1× s2 = 28525 instead of 40750). Computing the product s1× s2 for various values of K
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using the results of the previous subsections, indicates that the optimum choice minimizing
the product is at K = 8 with s2 = 7.
3.1.4 Simulation Results with Reduced Counters
The same streams used in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2 are now used to compute the entropy
norm with the reduced counters as obtained above with ε = 0.2, δ = 0.2 and ∆ = 1. The
corresponding tables with the same nomenclature as in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are given in
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. In Table 3.1 28525 random variables (counters) are used
for the epoch of 106 packet headers. In Table 3.2, for an epoch of 105 packet headers, a total
of 23877 random variables (counters) are used. The two cases in Table 3.2 are considered as
in Table 2.2 with the corresponding q, f as given below: Case 1: q1 = [1, 40700, 9299], f1 =
[9301, 2, 1] and Case 2: q2 = [5, 10, 100, 2000, 47885], f2 = [4823, 1000, 100, 4, 1].
Table 3.1. FH Computation Simulations with Reduced Counters - Random Traffic
n Fhm Ft % error in norm ratio FhmFt
1500 9.3827 × 106 9.3820 × 106 0.1435 0.9986, 1.0000, 1.0014
10000 6.6434 × 106 6.6512 × 106 0.2313 0.9981, 1.0000, 1.0023
50000 4.3724 × 106 4.3586 × 106 0.3929 0.9961, 1.0007, 1.0039
500000 1.4013 × 106 1.4111 × 106 1.6461 0.9835, 0.9963, 1.0118
Table 3.2. FH Computation Simulations with Reduced Counters - Skewed Traffic
q, f Fhm Ft % error in norm ratio FhmFt
Case 1 2.0796 × 105 2.0402 × 105 2.2569 0.9916, 1.0100, 1.0226
Case 2 4.7938 × 105 4.7716 × 105 1.1306 0.9952, 1.0028, 1.0113
These tables reveal that the reduced counters still produces entropy norm values well
within the bounds proscribed by the ε = 0.2 and δ = 0.2. However with the decreased
counters both the errors and the min, max spread of the ratio of the norm estimate to
the true norm has increased slightly in most cases. This is only to be expected. It is
important to realize that a 30% reduction in the counters still keeps these errors to about
2% even in the worst case while the expectation with the ε = 0.2 is that the errors will be
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around (within) 20%. This indicates that the variance bound imposed theoretically, based
on which the number of counters are derived, is very conservative. An attempt to reduce
the variance bound is next developed in the following sections of this chapter.
3.2 Useful Inequalities for Tightening the Variance Bound
In this section, some useful bounds (inequalities) are shown either from the literature
or by deriving them.
3.2.1 Bound on X
The following bound on X is first shown.
(log2 e+ log2(r − 1)) <
X
m
= (r log2(r)− (r − 1) log2(r − 1)) < (log2 e+ log2(r)) (3.10)
Of the two bounds in (3.10), the upper bound is available in [14] while the lower bound is
a new derivation. The upper bound follows by considering
2
X
m =
rr
(r − 1)r−1 = r
(
r
r − 1
)r−1
= r
(
1 +
1
r − 1
)r−1
< er (3.11)
The last step follows from the fact that for finite r > 1, (1 + 1/(r − 1))r−1 is < e and
asymptotically approaches e as r →∞. The lower bound follows by considering
rr
(r − 1)r−1 = (r − 1)
(
r
r − 1
)r
= (r − 1)
(
1 +
1
r − 1
)r−1 (
1 +
1
r − 1
)
> e(r − 1) (3.12)
The last step follows from the fact that for finite r > 1, (1 + 1/(r − 1))r−1(1 + 1/(r − 1))
is > e and asymptotically approaches e as r→∞.
A plot of the inequalities of (3.10) is shown in Fig. 3.1. The inequalities are within 1%
of the true value of X/m for r ≥ 14 and within 5% for r ≥ 4. The right-hand inequality of
(3.10) will be exploited later in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.1. Upper Bound, True Value, and Lower Bound of Xm
3.2.2 Bound on Sum of Logarithms
A number of useful inequalities involving logarithmic series are derived in this section.
The logarithm function is concave, (second derivative is < 0). Interpreting the sum in the
following logarithmic series as rectangular approximation of the area under the logarithm
function, an inequality can be developed as per (3.13).
m∑
r=2
log2(r) <
1
ln(2)
∫ m+1
2
ln(x)dx =
[(m+ 1) ln(m+ 1)− 2 ln(2) −m+ 1]
ln(2)
= (m+ 1) log2(m+ 1)− 2− (m− 1) log2(e) (3.13)
The last step in (3.13) is obtained by integration by parts. The upper limit of the integra-
tion is m+ 1 as this is needed to encompass the last rectangle in the series. A plot of the
bound and the true values for various values of m is depicted in Fig. 3.2 and the error as
m increases is within 2.5% for m > 22.
Next, the following sum of squares logarithmic series can also be bounded similarly:
m∑
r=2
[log2(r)]
2 <
[
1
ln(2)
]2 ∫ m+1
2
[ln(x)]2 dx
=
[
(m+ 1) [ln(m+ 1)]2 − 2[ln(2)]2 − 2 ∫m+12 ln(x)dx]
[ln(2)]2
= (m+ 1) (log2(m+ 1))
2 − 2− 2 log2(e)
∫ m+1
2
log2(x)dx (3.14)
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Figure 3.2. Bound and True Value of Sum of Logarithms
In the right hand side of (3.14) the integral left can be evaluated into a closed form ex-
pression. This is not shown here as in the typical use of this inequality in this thesis, this
integral cancels with another as will be seen in (3.20) the next subsection. A plot of the
bound of (3.14) and the true values for various values of m is depicted in Fig. 3.3 and the
error as m increases is within 3.5% for m > 24. Two conservative inequalities which are
Figure 3.3. Bound and True Value of Sum of Squares of Logarithms
used in the following section are next derived.
∑n
i=1(log2(mi))
2∑n
i=1mi log2(mi)
≤ k = 0.5283∑n
i=1 log2(mi)∑n
i=1mi log2(mi)
≤ k = 0.5 (3.15)
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The approach taken to derive is to assume there exists a bound k for each inequality and
then to calculate it conservatively. With xi = log2(mi) and xi = 1 for the left hand side of
the first and second inequality in (3.15),the numerator and denominator on the left hand
side can be written as below and with a bound k the implication in (3.16) is obtained:
log2 (
∏n
i=1m
xi
i )
log2 (
∏n
i=1m
mi
i )
≤ k ⇒
n∏
i=1
mxi−kmii ≤ 1 (3.16)
The inequality in (3.16) can be conservatively satisfied if
k ≥ max
(
xi
mi
)
mi = 2, 3, . . . (3.17)
In (3.17), the value of mi is > 1, since 1 power anything (in (3.16)) is 1 and does not
contribute to the bound. A simple computation now reveals that for the first inequality
the max in (3.17) is at k = 0.5283 when mi = 3 and for the second inequality it is at 0.5
when mi = 2 as claimed in (3.15).
3.3 Bound on Variance of the Random Variable X
In this section, the variance of the random variable X is bounded. While the section
follows the tight bound section derived in [14], the bounding is done using the inequalities
derived in the previous sections in an attempt to obtain new insight on the variance.
Var(X) = E(X2)− (E(X))2 (3.18)
E(X2) = m
n∑
i=1
mi∑
r=1
(r log2(r)− (r − 1) log2(r − 1))2 < m
n∑
i=1
mi∑
r=1
(log2(e) + log2(r))
2
(3.19)
In (3.19), the inequality is obtained using the right hand inequality of (3.10). The inequality
in (3.19) is expanded and simplified below using the inequalities (3.13, 3.14):
E(X2) < m
n∑
i=1
mi∑
r=1
(
(log2(e))
2 + 2 log2(e) log2(r) + (log2(r))
2
)
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= m2 (log2(e))
2 +m
(
n∑
i=1
mi∑
r=1
[
2 log2(e) log2(r) + (log2(r))
2
])
< m2 (log2(e))
2 +m
(
n∑
i=1
[
2 log2(e)
∫ mi+1
2
log2(r)dr +
∫ mi+1
2
(log2(r))
2 dr
])
= m2 (log2(e))
2 +m
(
n∑
i=1
[
2 log2(e)
∫ mi+1
2
log2(r)dr +
(mi + 1) (log2(mi + 1))
2 − 2− 2 log2(e)
∫ mi+1
2
log2(x)dx
])
= m2 (log2(e))
2 +m
(
n∑
i=1
[
(mi + 1) (log2(mi + 1))
2 − 2
])
= m2 (log2(e))
2 − 2mn+m
(
n∑
i=1
[
(mi + 1) (log2(mi + 1))
2
])
(3.20)
Using log2(mi + 1) = log2[(mi)(1 + 1/mi)] ≤ log2(mi) + 1 for all mi ≥ 1, (3.20) can be
written as
E(X2) < m2
[
1 + log22(e)
]
−mn
+ m
n∑
i=1
[
mi log22(mi) + 2mi log2(mi) + log
2
2(mi) + 2 log2(mi)
]
< 3.1m2+m
n∑
i=1
[
mi log22(mi) + 2mi log2(mi) + log
2
2(mi) + 2 log2(mi)
]
(3.21)
The last step in (3.21) follows using the numerical value of log2(e) = 1.4427... and upper-
bounding its square. Using E(X) =
∑n
i=1miai, (ai = log2(mi)), the Var(X) in (3.18) can
now be bounded as
Var(X) < 3.1m2 +m
n∑
i=1
[
mia
2
i + 2miai + a
2
i + 2ai
]
−
(
n∑
i=1
miai
)2
= 3.1m2 +m
n∑
i=1
[
2miai + a2i + 2ai
]
+
{(
n∑
i=1
mi
)
n∑
i=1
[
mia
2
i
]}
−
(
n∑
i=1
miai
)2
= 3.1m2 +m
n∑
i=1
[
2miai + a2i + 2ai
]
+
n−1∑
i=1,j>i
[
mimj(ai − aj)2
]
(3.22)
In (3.22), the last step can be seen by careful expansion of the rightmost two bracketed
quantities of the previous step and simplifying the resultant expansions systematically.
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Finally, for use in Chebyshev’s inequality [12], (3.22) is modified as:
Var(X)
E(X)2
<
3.1m2 +m
∑n
i=1
[
2miai + a2i + 2ai
]
+
∑n−1
i=1,j>i
[
mimj(ai − aj)2
]
(
∑n
i=1miai)
2
= 3.1
m2
E(X)2
+
[
m
E(X)
] [
2E(X) +
∑n
i=1
[
a2i + 2ai
]
E(X)
]
+
∑n−1
i=1,j>i
[
mimj(ai − aj)2
]
E(X)2
(3.23)
To proceed, assumptions are made on the value of E(X) as E(X) > m/∆ with ∆ > 0
in [13]. ∆ is taken as 1 in [14]. The entropy of n packet headers assuming uniform
random distribution is H = log2(n). Entropy is related to the entropy norm [13] by
H = (m log2(m) − E(X))/m where E(X) = FH is the entropy norm. The expression for
variance can now be bounded as
Var(X)
E(X)2
< 3.1∆2 + 3.53∆ +O (log2(m)) (3.24)
Except for the last term in (3.23) the rest of the expressions can be bounded by finite
quantities. The last term must be of the form O (log2(m)) i.e. k(log2(m)) where k is
conjectured to be << 1, based on the simulations conducted in Chapter 2. However, at
the time of writing this thesis, it has not been possible to prove it mathematically. If
this can be done, then the total number of counters can be reduced significantly which
will be very effective for hardware implementation. This will be an area for future work.
While the procedure followed here in bounding the V ar(X) has been done taking [14]
as the starting point, what has been presented here is a completely different bounding
technique and produces different results. Primarily, the key result in this section is the
closed form expression in (3.23) which leads to (3.24). Though the authors of [14] claim
that their bounds are the tightest in the literature, the authors in [13] have a much stronger
theoretical bound. The same analysis used in this chapter to arrive at (3.23) can also be
extended to the expression in [13].
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CHAPTER 4
HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION IN XILINX FPGA
The target Xilinx FPGA chosen for study of feasibility of the hardware implementation
is the XC2VP30. The reason for this choice is that, the Xilinx University Program (XUP)
board is available in the USF laboratory. The design is carried out using the Xilinx software
tools version 9.2i. The software packages available in this version are the Xilinx ISE and
the Xilinx EDK. Xilinx EDK 9.2 no longer supports the XUP board and the entire design
was carried out using only the Xilinx ISE. Xilinx indicates that a future version of the EDK
will support the board. The resources available in the XC2VP30 are: 27392 4-input LUTs,
136 18 kbit Block SelectRAM (bRAM, configurable in standard data widths only) and 136
18× 18 Block multipliers. There are upto 8 digital clock modules (DCMs) available on the
chip which can be configured to increase the internal clock frequency. The period of the
clock of the XUP board is 10 ns. Using these DCMs the chip can be internally clocked
at a period of 5 ns. This is the maximum clock rate for the bRAM that was obtained
during simulations for this chip. This is also the maximum performance estimate as given
by the Xilinx bRAM notes [18]. ModelSim 6.1XE starter version is the tool of choice for
post-route simulations of designs. The waveforms shown in this chapter are obtained from
the post-route design simulated with ModelSim. The hardware description language in
which design is carried out is Verilog.
The USF Academic Computing provided a minutes’s capture of IP data, that had ap-
proximately 2.6×106 packets. While it was indicated that this capture was based on a very
low-traffic flow during off-peak hours, it is to be anticipated that normal IP data traffic
will far exceed this number. An online free software [16] was used to extract this captured
data and organize it into its constituent IP packet header features like source/destination
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MAC address, IP version, source/destination IP address, source/destination port, applica-
tion using the IP protocol etc. A simple program was then developed to extract from this,
only what is relevant for this work i.e. IP header source/address information. Only the IP
destination addresses will be considered for all further analysis.
Normally on a 1 Gbit/sec router, based on an assumed average packet size of 300 bytes
[3], approximately 450 × 103 number of packets can be expected in a second. On a 10
Gbit/sec router, this number would be approximately 4.5 × 106 in a second. The number
of counters needed for the algorithm is based on the total number of packets m, fixed
beforehand. As stated in Chapter 2, by trial and error, an epoch size of m = 106 was
fixed, taking into account the resources on the FPGA board but without under-utilizing
the board. Hence for all the hardware designs and simulations too, the epoch size of a
million packets has been used.
4.1 Mapping the Algorithm into Hardware
The hardware design has to handle 32 bit data because in Internet Protocol, version 4
(IPv4), the source and destination addresses need 32 bits for storage. Although the newer
IPv6 has larger address field of 128 bits, since the USF LAN data capture showed IPv4
headers, this version was used for the study. 32 bit registers are needed to store the packet
destination addresses and the count value (r in Code 2.1) for each of the randomly selected
packets will be stored in 16 or 32 bit counters. Initially 16 bit register for the count value
was selected to save hardware resources, subsequently in the bRAM based designs 32 bit
count value is used. The 32 bit register needed to store the packet destination addresses
serves a dual purpose: Initially it contains a random number that signifies when a packet
will be picked for monitoring and secondly from that instant on it stores the address of
the packet header that was available at that time instant on the bus. To be able to select
the packet header (address) at a time instant, there is a need for global sample (sequence)
count to be available to all modules so that, at the appropriate instant, the packet headers
can be picked up. There is also the need for a global packet header bus on which the packet
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addresses are placed in the design. The counter associated with each 32 bit packet header
register, contains the count or in other words, the number of times that packet header
address showed up in the data stream from its instant of sampling during the entire epoch.
This is the basic module that implements the computation of r, of the random variables
X of Chapter 2 as shown in Code 2.1. The design requires s1 × s2 such random variables,
and hence that many counters. Once an epoch of m packet headers is analyzed for count
values r, then post-processing of the r to compute the logarithms and the value of the
random variable X of step 3 of the Code 2.1 can be carried out. Finally the averaging
and median computations of (2.3) of Chapter 2 are also required in the post-processing
(post-epoch) phase. Lastly, in the pre-epoch phase, a random number generator to store
initial values in the packet header register is also needed. If the epoch size is m = 220 then
a 20 bit random number generator would suffice from which the first s1 × s2 values would
be selected and placed into the packet header registers before an epoch begins. Thus the
whole algorithm requires three phases, a pre-epoch phase (initialization phase), the epoch
phase (monitoring phase) and a post-epoch phase (computation phase).
Ideally, high speeds can be achieved during an epoch, if s1×s2 (given by the expressions
in Chapters 2, 3) packet header registers and counters which are used to monitor the data
stream, can all operate in parallel. This is the basic counter module and is the first design
considered. Only after exploring this module’s design space or modifications of it in the
next two sections, is the post-processing phase considered in subsequent sections.
4.2 Design 1: Counter Module
The block diagram of the Counter Module is shown in Fig. 4.1
4.2.1 Design 1: Operation
The input to the module consists of two buses:
1. The 32 bit wide packet header bus (ph bus).
23
Figure 4.1. A Counter Module
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2. A 16 or 20 bit wide (width depends on how many total packets m, are planned apriori
for the complete epoch) global sample or global sequence counter bus (gsc bus). For
a million packets, this bus is 20 bit wide. Should the design call for monitoring more
or less packets in an epoch, then this bus width can be increased or decreased to
match the number of packets to be monitored. The contents of this bus, is the time
instant for choosing packets whose sampling instant, a random number, is stored in
the ph register during reset of this module. The value on the gsc bus is incremented
every time a packet shows up on the packet header bus, and is synchronized with the
positive edge of the clock.
A random number generator is needed for storing initial value in the ph register in the
module. At the time of designing this module, one separate random number generator
module for the entire design was envisaged which would be used to initialize the 32 bit
ph registers with random values during reset. During testing of this design, the random
number generator in Verilog was used in the testbench fixture. For testing, random numbers
were also used to serve as packet headers. The ph bus served both, to initially carry the
random numbers for sampling at reset into the ph register, as well as to carry the packet
headers in the epoch phase. With reset high, the random number on the ph bus is loaded
into the ph register by exercising the ld line of the register. Simultaneously, the D flipflop
in the circuit is cleared. In testing since only random numbers are used for simulations,
the ph bus always has a stream of random numbers with every clock cycle.
The two modes of operation in the Counter Module is as follows.
1. Reset/Load Phase: A high on the reset line makes the output of the D flipflop(f/f)
low. The output of the f/f serves as the select signal S for the multiplexer. If S is
low, the gsc bus is chosen for comparison, else the ph bus is chosen for comparison.
When S = 0 the contents of the 32 bit register is compared with the gsc bus. If
there is a match, the comparator has an output of 1 which then forces the output
of the AND gate A high which serves as the load signal for the 32 bit register. The
ph bus contents then gets stored in the register. Thus, the 32 bit register which
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originally contained the random number which signals the time instant at which a
packet header (address) has to be picked, now stores the packet header available on
the ph bus and the flipflop is set to 1.
2. Increment Phase: When S = 1, the multiplexer chooses the packet header contents
for comparison. If there is match with the 32 bit ph register containing the IP header
address to the contents of the ph bus, then both the f/f and the comparator output
are high which enables the other AND gate B to increment the 16 bit counter value
associated with the 32 bit ph register in the module.
A project with 16 such Counter Modules in parallel was simulated to test the design and
its post-route simulation is shown as in Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3. Since now we need to address
each of the modules, there is additional circuitry needed for an address decoder and a
separate address enable (ae) line. During the initial phase of operation, when the reset and
the address enable (ae) signals are both high, random numbers available on the ph bus act
get stored into the 32 bit registers of every module. The address lines start at address 0 and
increment until address 15. During the reset phase the D flipflops in each module is also
cleared as explained above. When the reset goes low, the value on the gsc bus is checked
with the random number in the 32 bit register of each module, and if there is a match,
then the current contents of the ph bus, are loaded into the registers and the corresponding
counter value is set to 1. Thereafter, every time a new packet arrives on the ph bus, these
registers are checked for a match and the corresponding counters incremented.
4.2.2 Design 1: Advantages and Disadvantages
The Counter Module as described in the previous section is excellent for speed as
many such modules operating in parallel can achieve very high speeds only limited by
the maximum clock frequency possible on the XUP board and the DCMs. If the number of
modules = s1× s2, then all random variables X can be operated in parallel. By its design,
since it is a dedicated module, any number can be added, provided routing requirements
to multiple parallel modules are taken care of. However, The FPGA XC2VP30 has a total
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Figure 4.2. Initial Set up for 16 Counter Modules Simulation Waveforms
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Figure 4.3. Counters in Operation Simulation Waveforms
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of 27392 4-input LUTs. The number of such Counter Modules that can be fitted on the
board is only about 500 since each module occupied 54 LUTs. Since s1× s2 is 28525, even
on the largest Virtex-II Pro chip in the Xilinx family, this design cannot be accommodated
as only about 2000 Counter Modules can be fitted. The limitation of this design seems to
be only with available resources and not with the design itself and hence, this design is
abandoned. An alternative, although slower design, that could satisfy both the algorithm
requirements as well as possibly be fittable on the XC2VP30 chip, is investigated in the
next section.
4.3 Design 2: Counter Module Using the Block SelectRAM(bRAM)
4.3.1 Design Considerations
As described in the previous section, the parameters that we need to store and keep
track of, are the IP destination address and the associated counter value. The aim is
to be able to fit 28525 packet headers and (s1 × s2 = 28525) counters. The IP packet
header source/destination headers need 32 bit storage space. The count value (in the case
of normal IP traffic patterns)for each of these distinct packet headers should normally
require possibly only 16 bits to store a count value of not more than 65536. The usage of a
bRAM fits the algorithm’s data structure of a matrix, because of its requirement of s1× s2
counters.
The Xilinx XUP Virtex-II Pro board has 136 bRAM each of which is 18 kbit [18]. The
actual available number of blocks depend on the width of the bRAM used. If the data
width is more than 32 bits wide, then the available number drops, because the Xilinx ISE
through its IP core option cascades/tiles two or more blocks to accommodate the width
needed. For example, since the IP addresses are 32 bits long, and if the counter values
required is assumed 16 bits, then the memory width for the design would have been 48
bits. But when the design was simulated using 48 bits bRAM, the ISE ended up using 3
bRAMs instead of 1. The effective number of counters accommodated on the XC2VP30
then would a maximum of 11605 (1363 × 256) counters instead of 28525 counters. Hence
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this design has to be changed for something that would not end up using so many bRAMs,
and at the same time, satisfy the counter requirements for an epoch of one million packets.
Configuring a 512 by 32 bRAM as a dual port RAM with 256 even address locations
serving to hold packet header address and 256 corresponding odd address locations holding
the counter value enables the use of just one bRAM per such configuration. Using 112
bRAMs and therefore 256 counters per bRAM in this configuration provides a total of
28672 counters and therefore allows an epoch of 1 million packets to be handled. Since
both even and odd memory addresses can be simultaneously accessed and independently
written to, this approach to storing the counters and packet address values is quite efficient.
However the penalty is in speed. Since now, on each packet address available on the ph
bus, every even location must be searched to see if the corresponding packet header exists
at that location and if it exists then the corresponding counter at the odd address which
is simultaneously available for incrementing is incremented and written back. To handle
the initialization with random sampling instants at the even locations, the initial random
numbers can be loaded through a file for the bRAM, that the ISE provides. However, this
works only for simulations as hardware reset does not load the file again. The random
number generator and entry of data into these bRAM locations will be addressed later for
this design in Section 4.5. It is to be noted that for an epoch of a million packet headers,
the maximum count value is not more than 220 and therefore to code the counter value
requires at most 20 bits per packet header. The extra bits available in the counters can be
used to store additional information.
Thus by increasing the counter width to 32 bits instead of 16 bits, a better design
emerges due to the limitations imposed by the Xilinx tools when using the bRAMs.
4.3.2 Design 2: Advantages and Disadvantages
This is a good design for fitting in several counters within one block. This hardware
design also fits the general data structure (sketch) of the algorithm, i.e of the notion of
having s1× s2 counters. Several such blocks, in this case, 16 bRAM blocks could be linked
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Figure 4.4. Counter Module with bRAM Simulation Waveforms
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to get 4096 counters > s1 = 4075 (from Chapter 2) counters for an epoch of a million
packets, and there would be s2 = 7 such groups to cover the 112 bRAMs. Furthermore,
the additional circuitry needed for comparing packet headers on the ph bus, global sample
(sequence) counter values and for controlling the state machine of this module of 256
counters in one bRAM occupies 141 LUTs and allows the fittability of 112 such modules
into the XC2VP30 with additional room to spare for other circuits. The drawback is now
speed. A 5 ns clocking period (200MHz clocking frequency) of this design is possible. To
compare a packet header with each location requires a READ state to read from memory
the contents of the packet header area and counter value, a WAIT state to settle the
outputs, a WRIT state when all comparisons and increments are made as appropriate and
write back to memory locations of the contents, a LOOP state where address increment
occurs or if all done a finish signal is raised to provide handshaking with the test bench
module to provide the next packet header on the ph bus. The module goes back to a
STRT state where it awaits a start signal from the test bench module when the next
packet header is applied. Thus if 1 ≤ N ≤ 256 counters are present in the bRAM, then the
smallest time period before the next packet header can be applied is 1+N×4 clock periods.
If N is 256 then 1025 clock periods elapse before a new packet header can be processed
by this design. Since all (112) bRAMs can be operated in parallel, with a 5 ns clocking
period, the packet headers can be applied to the design at intervals of 5.125 µs. However it
should be remembered that the design requires additional post-processing circuitry and the
addition of these circuitry and post-route simulations of the composite design may change
this maximum clocking period due to delays introduced by routing. Consequently a more
realistic expectation for this design is a 10 ns clocking period leading to maximum packet
header intervals of 10.25 µs. The simulations shown in Fig. 4.4 are with a 10 ns clocking
period. The design allows trading off speed to number of counters in each bRAM. In the
XC2VP100 with a total of 444 bRAMs, using 64 counters in each bRAM provides almost
the required number of counters and the overall packet header throughput can be increased
by 4 times from the numbers indicated above.
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During the initial part of this work, it was planned that the Xilinx EDK 9.2i, would
be used for simulating the above designs. The original design was to use the PowerPC
on the XUP board to handle the post-processing phase of the algorithm. Since it was
later realized that this version of EDK does not support the available Xilinx FPGA board,
additional circuitry described in the next section for post-processing of the counter values
had to be designed.
4.4 Logarithm Module
A logarithm (base 2) circuit (log circuit) is needed in the design to compute the random
variablesXij as shown in Code 2.1 withX = m (r log2(r)− (r − 1) log2(r − 1)). In Chapter
3 it was shown that this equation (3.10) is well approximated for large r ≥ 4 to 5% error
and for r ≥ 15 to 1% error by the right or left hand side of (3.10). To keep the errors
introduced by this approximation low, for values of r ≤ 15, the equation in Code 2.1 is
precomputed and looked up, while beyond that, it is computed using the right hand side of
(3.10). The right hand side of (3.10) reduces the computation by having just 1 logarithm
computation and one addition instead of 2 multiplications, 2 logarithms, 1 subtraction and
1 addition.
4.4.1 Design of the Log Circuit
The input to the log circuit is a positive integer and represents the final count value of
how many times a packet showed up in the stream. Since the maximum epoch is assumed
to handle upto a million packets, the maximum counter value is coded in 20 bits and the
logarithm value therefore requires at most 5 bits for its integer portion. (log2(220) = 20).
If the overall logarithm value has to fit into an 8 bit register, then it leaves 3 bits for the
fractional part. The algorithm of the log circuit is described in Code 4.1. The output
of the log circuit has an overall accuracy of three places after the binary point. The
maximum error is ±0.125. During normal operation, the final count value for each of the
counters may be small, but during anomalies, they can reach high values, and one place
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Begin
MCnt =0;SCnt=0;
Read InputNumber
While (InputNumber 6= 0)
Begin
Shift
SCnt++;
End
Set Size
Set base
While ((base * Size) ≤ InputNumber)
MCnt++;
Return LogNum = SCnt + MCnt
End
Code 4.1. Pseudocode of Algorithm for Logarithm Computation
after decimal point is all that is required in such cases. So the choice of three places after
binary point is quite adequate. The design uses the basic multiplier module available in the
Xilinx library. There are three different ways a multiplier style can be configured on the
Xilinx FPGA and these are as follows: 1. Block multiplier (preconfigured as an 18× 18 bit
multiplier producing 36 bit result. There are 136 such multipliers on the XC2VP30 chip).
2. LUT multiplier (bit size configured as required) and 3. Pipelined LUT multiplier (bit
sizes configured as required but usually requires more LUTs than choice 2 for multiplier
style). Of these three, preliminary simulations show that the pipelined LUT multiplier
can be clocked the fastest, the LUT is the next fastest and the Block multiplier is slowest
for this application. A choice of the Block multiplier would mean, that since the input is
more than 18 bits, the Xilinx tools use 2 Block multipliers for each log circuit. A Block
multiplier is efficient in terms of overall LUT utilization, because of dedicated hardware
multiplier. LUT based multipliers need additional LUTs. With the LUT multiplier based
design, the Logarithm Module takes 363 LUTs.
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Figure 4.5. Logarithm Module Simulation Waveforms for Computing log2(106)
4.4.2 Log Circuit Performance
The log circuit takes a maximum of 29 clock cycles to compute logarithm of an integer
from 1 to 220 and is clockable at 5 ns period and this is the period used in the test results
of this section. In Figure 4.5, the waveforms of the log circuit for computing the logarithm
alone are shown. In Table 4.1 a comparison of the performance of the log circuit both in
terms of numerical accuracy and speed of computation is made with Matlab computations
of the log running on a 1.54 GHz Pentium (dual core) machine. The Matlab timing results
in Table 4.1 are computed as an average of a million repeated logarithm computations.
From the results of Table 4.1 it can be seen that the log circuit operates at a clock rate
that is 8 times slower than the Pentium processor clock, but is still faster than Matlab
computations. Only the logarithm computation timing is shown in the table as the lookup
for count values r ≤ 15 and addition needed in equation (3.10) can be accomplished in less
than this time or in about the same time.
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Table 4.1. Accuracy and Speed of the Log Circuit in Comparison with Matlab
Number Log of Number Error Time taken
Log circuit Matlab Log circuit(ns) Matlab(ns)
200 MHz clk 1.54 GHz processor
47 5.625 5.5546 -0.0704 70 203
243 7.875 7.9248 0.0498 90 219
999 10.0 9.9643 -0.0357 100 219
1024 10.0 10 0.0 65 109
7021 12.875 12.7775 0.0975 114 203
9999 13.375 13.2876 0.0874 100 219
25000 14.625 14.6096 -0.0154 115 203
50832 15.625 15.6334 0.0084 120 203
73222 16.25 16.1600 0.09 110 219
111111 16.75 16.7616 -0.0116 130 218
499502 18.875 18.9301 0.0551 130 203
637421 19.375 19.2819 0.0931 130 203
872119 19.75 19.7342 -0.0158 145 218
1000000 20.000 19.9316 -0.0684 145 219
4.5 RNG Module
The RNG Module is a random number generator. Xilinx supports loading the bRAM
locations with initial values, using an external file. However, as stated in Section 4.3.1,
this method works well only for simulations (one time). If the circuit is reset during a
simulation or at the end of a simulation, the bRAM locations do not hold their original
initial values. Hence a random number generator has to be part of the design along with
additional circuitry needed to initialize the bRAM locations with random values on reset.
During the initialization phase, just before the beginning of an epoch, the bRAM (even)
addresses are initialized with random numbers denoting the sampling instant. The random
number generator design is a simple LFSR (linear feedback shift register) with feedback
tap points well documented in the literature for various bit sizes [17]. This design is chosen
because Matlab simulations of the histogram shown in Fig. 4.6 of the generated random
numbers by this method shows a uniform distribution. The design selected uses a 20 bit
LFSR and uses tap points [17] at various bit locations, with an initial seed that is provided
in the 20 bit register at reset. Random numbers with a periodicity of 1048575 i.e (220 − 1)
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Figure 4.6. Matlab Simulation of Random Number Generator
Figure 4.7. RNG Module Simulation Waveforms
is generated by this random number generator and suffices for the million period epoch.
A test run of the random number generator is shown in Fig. 4.7. This is sufficient for
our applications as only 28672 values are needed at most (112 bRAMs × 256 counters in
each bRAM). Using one such random number generator per module adds minimally to the
overall LUTs (just one additional LUT) and as long as the seed provided in each module
is relatively prime with the seeds in the other modules, the random number sequences for
each bRAM module is independent. For test simulations the module with a smaller word
size (8 bits) with appropriate taps [17] is used.
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Figure 4.8. The Integrated Module
4.6 Integrated Module
The block diagram of the Integrated Module is shown in Fig. 4.8. To implement the
whole algorithm for an epoch of 106 packets, 112 such modules are needed. Due to design
and routing constraints, it was necessary to design all three parts of the algorithm i.e.,
pre-epoch phase, the epoch phase, and the computing and local averaging of all the 256
random variables of post-epoch phase of the algorithm within the same module. Each
Integrated Module contains a Counter Module using the bRAM, a RNG Module, and a
Logarithm Module. Finally at the end of the epoch, it returns the average of all the 256
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computed random variables i.e., computes (
∑256
i=1Xi)/256. Simulation waveforms repre-
senting pre-epoch, epoch and post-epoch phases are shown in Fig. 4.9 through Fig. 4.13.
1. In Fig. 4.9 waveforms show the write signal wea begin enabled to write to each (even
addresses) of the 256 locations of bRAM.
2. In Fig. 4.10 waveforms show bRAM location 12 has a random number = 3
3. In Fig. 4.11 waveforms show signals wea and web enabled to store packet header 9
at time instant 3. Here random numbers generated by the simulator act as packet
headers.
4. In Fig. 4.12 waveforms show bRAM location 12 containing packet header 9 and the
counter value i.e., bRAM location 13 incremented by 1.
5. In Fig. 4.13 waveforms show random variable X computation of each counter value
(odd addresses) and a moving sum of all 256 bRAM locations.
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Figure 4.9. Pre-epoch Phase: Initialization
40
Figure 4.10. Epoch Phase: a
41
Figure 4.11. Epoch Phase: b
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Figure 4.12. Epoch Phase: c
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Figure 4.13. Post-epoch Phase: Random Variable Computation and Averaging
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4.6.1 Hardware and Software Comparisons of the Integrated Module
A comparative summary of the software simulations with Matlab and hardware simula-
tions in ModelSim of the Integrated Module using the same synthesized traffic is provided
in this section in tabular form for the waveforms shown for the run of Fig. 4.9 through
Fig. 4.13. The purpose is two fold: First, to provide a detailed comparison and verification
of the working of the hardware, and second, to provide a comparison of the final estimates
of the entropy norm provided by the hardware and software for a few runs.
The synthesized traffic is generated by using 1000 Verilog random numbers in the
test bench for the Integrated Module. A 1000 packet post-route hardware simulation in
ModelSim of one Integrated Module on a 1.54 GHz Pentium PC takes approximately 13
hours to run although this is only approximately 10.29 ms in actual hardware simulation
time.
The traffic stream generated by the Verilog test bench and the random numbers gen-
erated by the hardware for the initial sampling instants stored at the 256 locations in
bRAM were captured manually and used in the software (Matlab) simulations to verify
the hardware simulations and check the correctness of the hardware design.
Just after the epoch phase is completed, the contents of the counters in bRAM and the
corresponding counts from the software is depicted in Table 4.2 as r. The values match
exactly at all 256 locations in the Integrated Module. This proves the correctness of the
epoch phase part of the module as well as the pre-epoch phase (initialization) aspects of
the designed hardware module.
In the post-epoch phase, the random variable for each of these counters is computed
as X/m = r log2(r)− (r− 1) log2(r− 1) in software (Matlab) in floating point and printed
in Table 4.2 to 4 decimal places. In the hardware the corresponding X/m is computed
using fixed point arithmetic as described earlier in this chapter and these are also shown in
Table 4.2. The slight discrepancies are due to the use of fixed point arithmetic in hardware
versus floating point arithmetic in software. The percentage error between these two are
shown in the middle column of Table 4.2.
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The Integrated Module in the post-epoch phase keeps a running total of the computed
X/m variables, concurrently. This cumulative sum from the hardware is shown progres-
sively in Table 4.3 and the corresponding values obtained from floating point simulations
in Matlab for the same run are also shown along with the error percentage between these
two quantities.
Finally, the hardware computes the average of the random variables X/m by right
shifting by 8 bits (divide by 256) the cumulative total in the last clock cycle of the post
epoch phase. The software computes the average by dividing by 256 in floating point. The
results are 3.1875 and 3.2375 respectively, and represent FH/m. The error between the
two values is 1.5%. In Table 4.3 the final row shows the average value of the cumulative
sum of all 256 random variables as computed by the hardware and software.
The entropy norm FH is X/m(avg) ×103, where 103 is the number of packets m, used
in the hardware simulations shown in Fig. 4.9 through 4.13. Therefore, the final values of
3187.5 (3.1875× 103) from hardware and 3237.5 (3.2375× 103) from software are the esti-
mates of the entropy norm (FH) as computed with 256 counters (in 1 Integrated Module)
and are within 1.5% of each other.
Two additional 1000 packet runs on two other different distributions were made, to show
comparison between hardware and software estimates for FH . The results are tabulated
in Table 4.4. Each run of hardware simulations tabulated, represent approximately 10.5
ms of actual hardware time which includes the pre-epoch, epoch and post-epoch phases.
Therefore, the post-epoch phase adds very little additional hardware computation time.
To follow the pattern of the data structure of the algorithm, 16 such modules (256×16 =
4096) have to be grouped together, the average of all such modules, then becomes 1 of 7
(s2 = 7) values. The median of 7 such averages multiplied by the epoch size, in this case,
m = 106 is the value of the entropy norm. The block diagram of this approach is illustrated
in Fig. 4.14. Each module has its own random number generator and should be provided
with a different seed that is relatively prime to the others, to ensure that different modules
do not pick up the same packets for monitoring purposes. Initialization is done, at the
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Table 4.2. Comparison of Hardware Simulations Vs Software Simulations - Part 1
Hardware Simulations Software Simulations
Counter r X/m % Error X/m r
Addr Hex Decimal
1 3 02C 2.7500 0.1774 2.7549 3
3 3 02C 2.7500 0.1774 2.7549 3
5 4 034 3.2500 -0.1506 3.2451 4
7 7 042 4.1250 0.4034 4.1417 7
9 5 03A 3.6250 -0.4255 3.6096 5
11 6 03E 3.8750 0.6445 3.9001 6
13 2 020 2.0000 0 2.0000 2
15 4 034 3.2500 -0.1506 3.2451 4
17 4 034 3.2500 -0.1506 3.2451 4
19 4 034 3.2500 -0.1506 3.2451 4
21 2 020 2.0000 0 2.0000 2
23 3 02C 2.7500 0.1774 2.7549 3
25 6 03E 3.8750 0.6445 3.9001 6
27 6 03E 3.8750 0.6445 3.9001 6
29 7 042 4.1250 0.4034 4.1417 7
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
483 5 03A 3.6250 -0.4255 3.6096 5
485 6 03E 3.8750 0.6445 3.9001 6
487 4 034 3.2500 -0.1506 3.2451 4
489 3 02C 2.7500 0.1774 2.7549 3
491 6 03E 3.8750 0.6445 3.9001 6
493 8 046 4.3750 -0.6090 4.3485 8
495 6 03E 3.8750 0.6445 3.9001 6
497 3 02C 2.7500 0.1774 2.7549 3
499 4 034 3.2500 -0.1506 3.2451 4
501 6 03E 3.8750 0.6445 3.9001 6
503 2 020 2.0000 0 2.0000 2
505 4 034 3.2500 -0.1506 3.2451 4
507 3 02C 2.7500 0.1774 2.7549 3
509 5 03A 3.6250 -0.4255 3.6096 5
511 3 02C 2.7500 0.1774 2.7549 3
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Table 4.3. Comparison of Hardware Simulations Vs Software Simulations - Part 2
Hardware Simulations Software Simulations
Counter Cum Sum of X/m % Error Cum Sum of X/m
Addr Hex Decimal
1 0002C 2.7500 0.1774 2.7549
3 00058 5.5000 0.1774 5.5098
5 0008C 8.7500 0.0558 8.7549
7 000CE 12.8750 0.1675 12.8966
9 00108 16.5000 0.0378 16.5062
11 00146 20.3750 0.1537 20.4064
13 00166 22.3750 0.1400 22.4064
15 0019A 25.6250 0.1032 25.6515
17 001CE 28.8750 0.0747 28.8966
19 00202 32.1250 0.0520 32.1417
21 00222 34.1250 0.0489 34.1417
23 0024E 36.8750 0.0585 36.8966
25 0028C 40.7500 0.1145 40.7967
27 002CA 44.6250 0.1608 44.6969
29 0030C 48.7500 0.1814 48.8386
. . . . .
. . . . .
483 030E0 782.0000 0.0610 782.4775
485 0311E 785.8750 0.0639 786.3776
487 03152 789.1250 0.0630 789.6227
489 0317E 791.8750 0.0634 792.3776
491 031BC 795.7500 0.0663 796.2778
493 03202 800.1250 0.0626 800.6263
495 03240 804.0000 0.0654 804.5264
497 0326C 806.7500 0.0658 807.2813
499 032A0 810.0000 0.0649 810.5264
501 032DE 813.8750 0.0677 814.4266
503 032FE 815.8750 0.0676 816.4266
505 03332 819.1250 0.0667 819.6717
507 0335E 821.8750 0.0671 822.4266
509 03398 825.5000 0.0649 826.0362
511 033C4 828.2500 0.0653 828.7911
X/m(avg) = 3.1875(033H) 1.5444 X/m(avg) = 3.2375
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Table 4.4. FH Computation Comparison - One Integrated Module
Hardware Simulations Software Simulations
Packet Header FH = X/m(avg) × 103 % Error FH = X/m(avg) × 103
Range
1 . . . 255 3.1875 × 103 1.5444 3.2375 × 103
1 . . . 49 5.6875 × 103 -1.9065 5.5811 × 103
0 . . . 10 7.8125 × 103 -0.7298 7.7559 × 103
time of the reset signal, before the epoch starts. This integrated design approach is highly
modular, self contained and easily scalable.
Approximately 585 LUTs are needed per module and the XC2VP30 can now only
accommodate overall 27392/585 ≈ 46 such modules. Thus in either case, using single
counter modules (of Section 4.2) or the bRAM based Counter Module (of Section 4.3) the
XC2VP30 cannot hold the entire design.
An alternative design approach would be to have the Counter Module with bRAM as
one separate module, and have either one or several (optional) Logarithm Modules as the
other module for post-epoch processing. This design would probably fit comfortably in the
XC2VP30 FPGA, and the number of LUTs used overall would be reduced. But at the time
of connecting the modules together, it was realized that Xilinx does not support enough
tri-state buffers to isolate bRAMs from a common bus. A multiplexed design approach
would consume additional LUTs to connect each of the 112 modules one by one to the
Logarithm Module along with additional circuitry for addressing each of these modules.
This design approach would greatly reduce the speed of the post-epoch phase. Hence
it had to be modified to something that would access the bRAM output bus, without
bus contention. The cost to this is embedding the Counter Module with bRAM into the
Logarithm Module. This would take additional LUTs not only because the additional
module would be embedded into each block, but also because of the additional routing and
states needed to control the Integrated Module.
While 112 of the Integrated Modules do not fit on the XC2VP30, the XC2VP100 chip
in the same Virtex-II Pro family of with resources of 444 bRAMs, 444 Block multipliers
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and 99 × 103 LUTs can accommodate the entire design quite comfortably as envisaged.
Other FPGA boards in the same Virtex-II Pro family handle this requirement.
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Figure 4.14. Block Diagram of all 112 Modules and their Interconnect
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Figure 4.15. Median Module Simulation Waveforms
4.7 Median Module
The estimate of the entropy norm as discussed in Chapter 2, is the median of all s2 = 7
values. A hardware module based on a simple sorting algorithm, the selection sort, is used
to sort the input numbers and pick the median. The input to the module is a set of values,
each of which, represents the average of the random variables of 16 Integrated Modules
as shown in Fig. 4.14, computed during the post-epoch phase. The hardware simulation
waveforms are shown in Fig. 4.15 and this module occupies 309 LUTs.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
The current work has concentrated on two aspects: first of all to find the possibility of
reducing the number of overall counters, and secondly to study the feasibility of hardware
(FPGA) implementation of the randomized algorithm in [13] for entropy norm computation
of IP data streams.
In Chapter 2, some theoretical aspects as well as Matlab simulations of the algorithm
were discussed. Simulations were carried out for both a uniformly random distribution
of packet headers, and skewed distribution. This initial simulation study was necessary
to study the overall algorithm structure as well as to get a feel for the total number of
counters needed for the algorithm.
In Chapter 3, it was shown that it is possible to reduce the overall number of counters
by about 30% just by reducing the s2 counters. This is necessary to fit a million packet
epoch conceptually on the XC2VP30 FPGA. Further tightening of the variance bound was
attempted in Chapter 3, and a new closed form expression for V ar(X)E[X]2 has been derived.
Although it has been conjectured that the constant k << 1 for the last term in expression
(3.24), at the time of writing this thesis, it has not been possible to prove it mathematically,
and give a much stronger bound on the overall expression for V ar(X)E[X]2 . This area will be a
subject for future work. A tighter bound in the closed form expression as shown in (3.24)
will significantly reduce the number of counters overall, and hence would be much more
feasible for a possible ASIC/FPGA implementation.
In Chapter 4 hardware designs along with their simulations were presented. A design
approach has been explored with design trade-offs. Constant modifications had to be
made in order to balance routing to all modules, while at the same time come up with a
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design that could fit into the hardware and operate at speeds capable of real-time packet
handling. The averaging of the logarithm computations of all the 256 counters available
in 1 bRAM and median computations can be accomplished after the epoch is completed
and the entropy norm computation is achievable in near real-time in a FPGA. Table 5.1
summarizes the total number of LUTs each designed module occupies.
The hardware designs discussed in Chapter 4 can broadly be classified as supporting
three different phases of operation of the algorithm.
1. Pre-epoch phase
In this phase, the registers that ultimately store the packet headers must be ini-
tialized with random numbers generated by the RNG Module (Section 4.5). If the
Integrated Module design approach is considered, since this will be replicated with
every module, initial seeds to each of these modules have to be such that the same
random sequence is not replicated. This is easily achieved by choosing numbers that
are relatively prime.
2. Epoch phase
Counter Module (Section 4.2) and Counter Module with bRAM (Section 4.3) dis-
cussed two design options. In this phase, packet headers will be stored into registers
based on the time instant in the registers, and monitoring of the packets will be done.
Counters associated with each packet header increments every time a packet header
once sampled repeats in the stream. The epoch for this study was fixed at 1 million
packets.
The first design is excellent for high processing speeds. Row 1 of Table 5.2 shows
packet handling capability of this design. The second design is a trade off between
speed and device utilization. The bRAM locations representing the counters contain
the frequency of packet headers for that epoch.
3. Post-epoch phase
Logarithm Module (Section 4.4) and Median Module (Section 4.7) are needed to
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Table 5.1. Device Utilization Summary of FPGA Synthesis on XC2VP30
Design type bRAM block Logic Route No of
Utilization through 4 input LUTs
Counter Modulea None 37 46 83
Counter Moduleb None 593 271 864
Counter Module with bRAM 1 85 62 147
Logarithm Module None 343 20 363
Median Module None 293 16 309
RNG Module None 1 - 1
Integrated Module 1 540 44 584
a1 Module Simulated
b16 Modules Simulated
compute the entropy norm of the IP data stream. In this phase, the random vari-
ables associated with each counter of the bRAM will be computed using the Log-
arithm Module and average of all locations of 1 bRAM will be computed. Several
such modules have to be grouped, and further, their average computed. The median
of several (s2) such averages will give (FH/m).
The final design, Integrated Module (Section 4.6) presented is highly modular, self
contained and scalable. For large scale applications the existing hardware can be scaled
up by adding Integrated Modules. Should the design call for entropy norm estimation of
other packet features, this information can be loaded on the bus, instead of the destination
address that is presently used. Should simultaneous entropy norm calculations be desired
for multiple features such as destination addresses and port numbers then duplication of
the modules and buses will be needed.
5.1 Alternative Design Considerations
In Chapter 4, the Counter Module using the bRAM was discussed. The design con-
sidered had 256 bRAM locations for counters, i.e., fully utilized each bRAM available, for
optimality. This leads to slower speed of operation while providing better utilization of
the FPGA. Higher processing speeds can be achieved if the design considered, utilized only
32 bRAM locations for counters. In Table 5.2 row 5, the increase in the packet handling
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Table 5.2. Summary of Design Capabilities
Design type No of Packet Handling Capability
clock cycles packets/min
Counter Module 2/3 4 Billion 8 Billion
200 MHz clock 400 MHz clock
RAM Based
256 counters 1025 5.85 Million 9.75 Million
100 MHz clock 166.66 MHz clock
32 counters 129 46.5 Million 77.5 Million
100 MHz clock 166.66 MHz clock
capacity with this approach is shown. But then, more bRAMs would be needed and an
increase in routing should also be taken into account.
5.2 Future Work
The next goal would be to find how to interface with the designed hardware and to
study the performance of the resultant hardware on IP data traffic.
The current study is by no means complete and exhaustive in terms of being able to
detect anomalies. Due to the challenging nature of the problem area, sustained and detailed
statistical studies have to be made using entropy results of not just one packet feature but
simultaneously several different features to arrive at conclusions. This takes considerable
amount of effort. Studies have to made at different times of the days over several months
to study the traffic pattern and then use this information to draw some conclusions about
anomalous behavior of the stream. The challenges that lie ahead would be in the following
issues:
1. What threshold to consider, for the entropy norm, in order to set up a conclusive
boundary between normal and anomalous traffic behavior.
2. What is a good epoch period for monitoring such traffic patterns.
Future study should also focus on reducing the number of counters because a vastly reduced
number of counters will be more conducive to an ASIC/FPGA implementation. On the
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hardware side, focus should be on interfacing the data from network links to provide
appropriate input to the existing hardware for entropy norm computations.
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